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Abstract 
The paper deals with the automobile third party liability insurance and several bonus malus system are compared in it on the 
basis of Loimaranta efficiency. Very important task for actuary is creating rating system that will fairly distributed the burden of 
claims among policyholders. For these purposes, most insurance companies use generalized linear models, especially Poisson 
regression. Thanks to these models the a priori tariff structure is created. But some heterogeneity still remains in this tariff 
structure. Therefore, insurance companies use the bonus malus system that rewards good drivers and penalizes bad drivers. In 
this paper the bonus malus system for sample of data is created and bayesian relativities are computed. Then this bonus malus 
system is compared with several bonus malus systems from Czech Republic.  The elasticity of these bonus malus systems is 
examined and then Loimaranta efficiency is used as main tool for comparison these systems. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
Very important task for the insurance companies is a determination of fair premium for each policyholder. This 
process we can call ratemaking process. First, the policyholders are distributed to the risk classes under their 
observable characteristics. Usually the generalized linear models are used for these purposes. This approach was 
described by Kafkova and Krivankova (2014).  
Then the base premium for each of the risk classes is determined. This premium is called a priori premium. The 
problem is residual heterogeneity that still remains within risk classes. Therefore a posterior corrections are used. 
Insurance companies use past claims experience information to determine a posterior premium. The common a 
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posterior ratemaking mechanism is bonus malus systems in third party liability automobile insurance. Such system 
penalizes policyholders responsible for one or more accidents by surcharges (maluses) and reward claim-free years 
by discounts (bonuses). 
In this article, we use the motor claims data as studied by Kafkova (2014), where the policyholders are partitioned 
into 36  a priori risk classes through the use of the risk classification variables. The predicted expected annual claim 
frequency ߣ௞ǡ ݇ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ͵͸ and the corresponding weights ݓ௞ are listed in this work. With these details, we create 
bonus malus system. For these purpose the quadratic loss function is used.  Pitrebois et al. (2003) derived an 
analytical formula for optimal relativity by minimizing the expected squared difference between the “true” relative 
premium ȣ and the relative premium ࢘ࡸ applicable to the policyholder after the steady state has been reached.  
We create two bonus malus systems using Bayesian relative premium according to rules of the two biggest 
insurance companies in the Czech Republic.   
Then we determine Loimaranta efficiency for each of this bonus malus system. It is a coefficient which serves to 
compare the quality of bonus malus system. It was published by Loimaranta (1972). 
2. Bonus malus system 
Even with a priori segmentation, some heterogeneity remains within the risk classes. This is a residual 
heterogeneity with a random effect ȣ௜. It can be caused by unobservable variables, such as driving capacity, drug, 
etc. For these reasons, insurance companies approach to individualization of risk and they use the BM system. 
We can denote by s the number of levels in our BM system. The levels κ are numbered from 1 to s. Claims are 
penalized by malus points (the driver goes up a certain number of levels each time he files a claim). Each claim-free 
year is rewarded by bonus point (the driver goes one level down). 
We assume that the knowledge of present level and of the number of claims of the present year suffices to 
determine the next level and that the annual claims numbers are independent. Then the trajectory across the BM 
levels may be represented by a Markov chain. 
Let ሼܮଵሺߴሻǡ ܮଶሺߴሻǡ ǥ ሽ denote the trajectory dependent on the annual expected claim frequency ࣖ. Let ࢖κଵκଶሺࣖሻ 
be the probability of moving from level κଵto level κଶ for policyholder with mean frequency ࣖ. 
Further, ࡼሺߴሻ is the one-step transition matrix, thus 
 
ࡼሺߴሻ ൌ ሼ݌κଵκଶሺߴሻሽǡκଵǡ κଶ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ݏǤ 
 
2.1. Behaviour of BM system 
All BM systems have the best level, with the property that a policy in that level remains in the same level after a 
claim-free period. We can define the stationary distribution ࣊ሺߴሻ ൌ  ൫ߨ଴ሺߴሻǡ ߨଵሺߴሻǡ ǥ ǡ ߨ௦ሺߴሻ൯Ԣ as follows:ߨκሺߴሻ is 
the stationary probability for policyholder with mean frequency ࣖ to be in level κ, thus  
ߨκଶሺߴሻ ൌ ௡՜ஶ ݌κଵκଶ
௡ ሺߴሻǤ 
 
Stationary probability ࣊ሺߴሻ does not depend on the starting level. We can compute the ࣊ሺߴሻ as a solution of the 
system 
൜࣊Ԣሺߴሻ ൌ ࣊Ԣሺߴሻࡼሺߴሻ࣊Ԣሺߴሻࢋ ൌ ͳǡ  
whereࢋ ൌ ሺͳǡͳǡ ǥ ǡͳሻǤ 
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2.2. The residual heterogeneity 
We assume that residual heterogeneity has random effect ȣ௜. Further we assume that number of claims ௜ܰ obeys 
a mixture of Poisson distribution, where the random parameter expresses the residual heterogeneity, that is 
 
ሾ ௜ܰ ൌ ݇ȁȣ௜ ൌ ߠሿ ൌ ሺെߣ௜ߠሻ
ሺߣ௜ߠሻ௞
݇Ǩ ǡ݇ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡʹǡ ǥ 
 
The ȣ௜ are assumed to be independent and to have common gamma density function  
 
ݑሺߠሻ ൌ ͳȞሺܽሻ ܽ
௔ߠ௔ିଵሺെܽߠሻǡ Ʌ ൐ ͲǤ 
 
Then ௜ܰ is negative binomially distributed and ሾȣ௜ሿ ൌ ͳ, ܸܽݎሾȣ௜ሿ ൌ ଵ௔Ǥ  
Now we have to estimate ܽ. A consistent estimator is given by 
 
ͳ
ොܽ ൌ
σ ቄ൫݊௜ െ ߣప෡൯ଶ െ ݊௜ቅ௡௜ୀଵ
σ ߣపଶ෢௡௜ୀଵ
Ǥ 
 
2.3. Bayesian relative premium 
The relativity associated with level κ is denote as ࢘र. Insured occupying the level κ pays an amount of premium 
equal to ࢘र% of the a priori premium determined on the basis of his observable characteristics. The aim is to make 
࢘र as close as possible to the risk factor ȣ of a policyholder picked at random from the portfolio. For this purpose, 
the minimization of 
ሾሺȣ െ ݎ௅ሻଶሿ 
is most commonly used.  
We assume that we pick at random a policyholder from the portfolio. We denote as Ȧ his a priori expected claim 
frequency and ȣ the residual effect of the hidden risk factors. Then the actual expected claim frequency of the 
policyholder is Ȧȣ. The random variable Ȧand ȣ may reasonably be assumed to be mutually independent. We 
denote ݓ௞ the weight of the ݇th risk class whose annual expected claim frequency is ߣ௞. Then  
ሾȦ ൌ ߣ௞ሿ ൌ ݓ௞Ǥ 
We denote ܮ the level occupied by this randomly picked policyholder who has a stationary position in level κǤ Then 
 
ሾܮ ൌ κሿ ൌ ෍ݓ௞ න ߨκሺߣ௞ߠሻݑሺߠሻߠ
ஶ
଴
ǡκ ൌ Ͳǡͳǡ ǥ ݏ
௞௟
ǡ 
 
where ߨκሺߣ௞ߠሻ ൌ ሾܮ ൌ κȁȦ ൌ ߣ௞ǡ ȣ ൌ ߠሿǤ 
Now we can estimate ࢘र as the minimum of ሾሺȣ െ ݎ௅ሻଶሿǤ We get 
ݎκ ൌ
σ ݓ௞ ׬ ߠߨκሺߣ௞ߠሻݑሺߠሻߠஶ଴௞
σ ݓ௞ ׬ ߨκሺߣ௞ߠሻݑሺߠሻߠஶ଴௞
Ǥ ሺͳሻ 
 
2.4. Calculation of the relative premium 
Bonus malus system of Czech Insurance Company has these rules: 
x each year a one-class bonus is given, 
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x each claim is penalized by going three classes down, 
x the maximal bonus is in the class 16, 
x the maximal malus is in the class 1. 
 
On the basis of these rules the relativities for individual levels are computed according to formula (1).  The 
comparison of the relativities of the Czech Insurance Company (CIC) with our relativities is mentioned in the    
Table 1. 
     Table 1.The comparison of our relative premium with relative premium of Czech Insurance Company 
Level κ Our relativities Relativities CIC Level κ Our relativities Relativities CIC 
1 304.68% 200% 9 153.96% 85% 
2 273.57% 170% 10 135.47% 80% 
3 248.73% 140% 11 126.38% 75% 
4 227.46% 120% 12 119.32% 70% 
5 209.39% 110% 13 92.88% 65% 
6 194.05% 100% 14 88.98% 60% 
7 177.73% 95% 15 85.32% 55% 
8 164.67% 90% 16 49.86% 50% 
 
We can see that BM system from Czech Insurance Company is not as stringent as our proposed BM system. The 
worst drivers pay only 200% of the a priori premium whereas in our BM system the worst drivers pay 304.68% of 
the a priori premium. This may be due to the effort to do the insurance more competitive.  
Second largest insurance company in the Czech Republic is Kooperativa. Their BM system follows these rules: 
x each year a one-class bonus is given, 
x each claim is penalized by going two classes down, 
x the maximal bonus is in the class 17, 
x the maximal malus is in the class 1. 
 
On the basis of these rules the relativities for individual levels are computed according to formula (1). The 
comparison of the relativities of the Kooperativa (Koop) with our relativities is mentioned in the Table 2. 
Table 2.The comparison of our relative premium with relative premium of Kooperativa 
Level κ Our relativities Relativities CIC Level κ Our relativities Relativities CIC 
1 362.88% 220% 10 194.71% 85% 
2 330.67% 180% 11 178.50% 80% 
3 305.16% 150% 12 167.23% 75% 
4 284.13% 130% 13 145.73% 70% 
5 265.97% 120% 14 136.86% 65% 
6 250.01% 110% 15 106.13% 60% 
7 235.02% 100% 16 101.24% 55% 
8 221.45% 95% 17 58.82% 50% 
9 207.10% 90%    
 
We can see that BM system from Kooperativa is not as stringent as our proposed BM system. The worst drivers 
pay only 220% of the a priori premium whereas in our BM system the worst drivers pay 362.88% of the a priori 
premium.  We can also see, that this BM system is stricter than BM system of Czech Insurance Company. The 
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system has only one bonus group, where the most of drivers is accumulated. In the following chapter we will 
compare efficiency of the BM systems. 
3. The Loimaranta efficiency 
The elasticity of BM system measures the response to a change in the expected claim frequency. Loimaranta 
efficiency could be defined as the elasticity of the relative premium induced by the BM system 
 
ܧ݂݂ሺߴሻ ൌ
݀ݎҧሺߴሻ
ݎҧሺߴሻ
݀ߴ
ߴ
ǡሺʹሻ 
where ݎҧሺߴሻ is the average relativity for a policyholder with annual expected claim frequency ߴ, therefore 
ݎҧሺߴሻ ൌ෍ߨκሺߴሻ
௦
κୀଵ
ݎκǤ 
For a reasonable bonus system (premium paid by the policyholders subject to BM scales is increasing in the 
expected claim frequency) the elasticity should be greater than or equal to 0. In ideal system ܧ݂݂ሺߴሻ ൌ ͳ. Than 
ܧ݂݂ሺߴሻ takes values between 0 and 1.  The value near to 0 implies that the system does not modify the structure of 
policyholders by classes when there is a change in the expected claims frequency.  
3.1. Computation of Loimaranta efficiency 
For computation of  Eff(ϑ) we must determine derivative of r ̅(ϑ) with respect to the annual expected claim 
frequency ϑ. Then we can use formula 
݀ݎҧሺߴሻ
݀ߴ ൌ෍
݀ߨκሺߴሻ
݀ߴ
௦
κୀଵ
ݎκǡ 
where ߨκሺߴሻ is stationary probabilities. To get ௗగκሺణሻௗణ , we have to solve the linear system  
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ݀࣊
ࢀሺߴሻ
݀ߴ ൌ
݀࣊ࢀሺߴሻ
݀ߴ ࡼሺߴሻ ൅ ࣊
ࢀሺߴሻ ݀ࡼሺߴሻ݀ߴ
෍݀ߨκሺߴሻ݀ߴ
௦
κୀଵ
ൌ Ͳ
 
with respect to the ௗగκሺణሻௗణ . 
3.2. Loimaranta efficiency as a function of annual claim frequency 
In this section Loimaranta efficiency is calculated according to the formula 2.9,  and it is demonstrated as a 
function of the expected annual claim frequency. The Figure1 shows a comparison of BM system from Czech 
Insurance Company (BMS 1) with our BM system (BMS 2) described in Table 1.  
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the BMS of CIC with our BMS 
The Figure 2 shows a comparison of BM systems from Kooperativa (BMS 1) with our BM system (BMS 2) 
described in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of the BMS of Koop with our BMS 
4. Conclusion 
This article shows the construction of two bonus malus systems on the bases of the rules of the two biggest 
insurance companies in the Czech Republic. Then the systems are compared by Loimaranta coefficient. As we can 
see in the Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, our proposed systems are more efficient than the systems used by insurance companies. 
The Loimaranta coefficients of our systems are greater than the Loimaranta coefficients for systems used by 
insurance companies. 
References 
Kafkova, S. (2014). Relative premium in vehicle insurance. In Oleg Deev, Veronika Kajurova, Jan Krajicek. European financial systems 2014. 
 Proceedings of the 11th international scientific conference. Brno: Masarykova univerzita,  295-299. 
Kafkova, S., & Krivankova, L. (2014). Generalized Linear Models in Vehicle Insurance. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae 
Mendelianae Brunensis, 62(2), 383-388. 
Loimaranta, K., (1972). Some asymptotic properties of bonus systems. Astin Bulletin, 6(03), 233-245. 
Pitrebois, S., Walhin, J. F., & Denuit, M. (2003). Setting a bonus-malus scale in the presence of other rating factors: Taylor's work revisited. Astin 
Bulletin, 33, 419-436. 
